The
2007 Bush-Putin Disagreement:
Some background on Anti Ballistic Missile Defense
Presented to the umpteenth
Seminar on Planetary Emergencies
Erice, Sicily
August 22nd 2007
The problem of anti ballistic missiles is not a new one. It is older
than thearguments of Edward Teller(1)
and President Ronald Reagan that led to the phrase "Start Wars". It
goes back at least to President Nixon in 1970. Scientists and others
thought that an anti ballistic missile program was an unnecessary
escalation of
the arms race.
Throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the United States had
been developing a
series of missile systems with the intention of shooting down incoming
ICBM warheads. During this period few people had realized that nuclear
weapons and a nuclear war would be
unlike any other. Whereas in a "conventional war, the advantage goes to
the country that can
deploy the greatest number of weapons, and that advantage goes as N^2,
in a nuclear war with a
hundred weapons or more everyone will lose. In the 1950s to 1960s the
US maintained a lead in
the number and sophistication of their delivery systems. An
anti-ballistic missile system was
considered to be an integral part of a defense of the US, reducing the
overall damage in a nuclear
confrontation which at that time the US military believed could be won.
The Nike-Zeus system was to be the basis for such a system and a
limited system to
defend missile bases was called Sentinel Around 1970, there was intense
public debate. As
relations between the US and USSR warmed in the later years of the
1960s, the US first
suggested an ABM treaty in 1967. This proposal was rejected by the USSR
and the interest of
the US government diminished. But academic scientists became active,
and included picketing
of Nixon's White House by physicists. One of them being my friend
Assistant Professor TBW
Kirk from Harvard. They felt that the ABM system would be an
unnecessary escalation of the
arms race. Whether or not that was important, a treaty to limit ABM
systems was signed in
Moscow on May 26, 1972 and ratified by the US Senate on August 3, 1972.
Following a
protocol in 1974 each side could develop one system, one to defend
Moscow and another to
Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. This treaty seen by many in
the West, including
myself, as a key piece in nuclear arms control.
But the treaty did not stop development and planning for a possible
future system. Panofsky pointed out that US funding for development of
an ABM system remained an
appreciable fraction of the US budget from President Nixon onwards.
Funding was still over $5
billion a year updated to 2007 dollars. The total so far is about $150
billion updated to 2007
dollars. This has been spent on "research, and partial tests of partial
systems".. Although an
article by Bethe and Garwin had appeared in 1968(2),
the generality of their argument was not
widely appreciated, and although some experts undoubtedly knew the
difficulties, a key issue
rendering an ABM system an escalation that was not only expensive, and
might not work, but
also useless, did not become apparent to most scientists until about
1990. At
first it was the
deployment of the Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle
(MIRV) system, allowing a
single ICBM missile to deliver several warheads at a time. Either the
USA or the USSR could
simply overwhelm the ABM defense system with numbers, as the same
number of missiles could
carry ten times more warheads. But it soon became clear that to
overwhelm an ABM system all
that is necessary would be to release relatively inexpensive decoys.
Interestingly, such an
overwhelming of a radar system was a crucial part of the
British-American strategy in May-June
1944 where Adolph Hitler became convinced that the liberation of
northern France would be
across the Straits of Dover, rather than in Normandy(3).
As a result all but one of the Nazi Panzer
divisions were unavailable to counter the attack on the coast of
Normandy.
The confrontation between USA and USSR was reduced to "Mutually Assured
Destruction" (MAD). Even as late as 1991 it was unclear that all the
USSR military understood
that it was indeed MAD. Indeed in a conversation in his office in May
1991, Marshal Yasov,
Defense Minister of the USSR, told us that : "Chernobyl taught those of
us who did not already
know, that a nuclear war could not be won. For if something designed
not to explode
(Chernobyl NPP) made that much mess a nuclear war would destroy the
planet." But before
1986 it was clearly worse. Soviet military theory fully involved the
mass use of nuclear devices,
in combination with massive conventional forces.
Ignoring these scientific facts, President Reagan, encouraged by Edward
Teller and
others, took office he made a hall mark the development of an ABM
system, which he called the
Stategic Defense Initiative (SDI).. On March 23, 1983. Reagan stated
that SDI was "consistent
with... the ABM Treaty" and he viewed it as a defensive system and even
suggested that the
Soviets would be given access to the SDI technology. It seems that
President Reagan really
believed that such a system would work. It is less clear about Edward
Teller's motivation. He
must have understood the technical arguments but felt that further
research might find a way
around the issue. In that he may had some history. When he, and others,
persuaded President
Truman to go against the advice of the Atomic Energy Commission and
build a hydrogen bomb,
it was thought to be a difficult task. But further research showed it
to be much easier than
thought. He might also be calling a bluff - ss suggested later by his
associate Dr Lowell Wood. The US at this time was allocating about 5%
of their GDP on military spending. The USSR was
allocating about 40% of their GDP, due to smaller overall economic base.(4). Secretary Yuri
Andropov of the USSR had a "peace offensive". Which was immediately
stalled. Andropov said
that "It is time they [Washington] stopped... searching] for the best
ways of unleashing nuclear
war... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible. It is insane".(5) The USSR felt they had to build
an ABM system to compete. In the early 1980s Secretary Gorbachev was
taking a hard line in
arms control discussions with the USA. He refused to discuss arms
control further while the
USA was developing, even though not deploying, an ABM system. Reagan
had met privately with Gorbachev in a famous "wawalk int he woods" at a
woodland in Chemin de la Voile on Lake Geneva. In November
1986, at the Rjehjavik summit, Gorbachev propsoed complete
disarmamnet but Reagain istted that an ant-balitic missile system was
an important part of this. Gorbachev dug his heels in and
insisted on the abandonment of the ABM program and also abandonment of
the planned US weappons tests. This
changed in 1987.
In 1987, the American Physical Society released a report (6) with many of the above
conclusions. More importantly in February 1987, Dr Evgeny Velikhov,
Science Advisor to
Secretary Gorbachev and a participant in several Erice seminars on
planetary emergencies,
organized a conference on a "Nuclear Free World" in Moscow. There were
about 2000
participants including 250 scientists. In a step that is unusual for
USSR, particularly Russian
meetings, participation was limited to 5 minutes each. Three scientists
discussed the ABM
system. Firstly Gerry Weisner, President of MIT, discussed the
technical issues, followed by
Andrei Sakharov, released from exile in Gorki the month before. It was
explained how it would
be hard to make it work, and it would be easy to frustrate the aims
with decoys. Then I made the
comment that it was no real threat to the USSr for the USA to waste
its' money, and that should
not be a reason for refusing to discuss important issues. At the final
session, held in the Palace
of the Congresses in the Kremlin, Gorbachev made a hard line speech
again refusing to discuss
matters and objecting to the US proposals to carry out a few more bomb
tests. This led to a
comment by a west German diplomat present "Don't Test Bombs; Test
Gorbachev.(7)" But
Gorbachev changed a couple of weeks later, presumably after a briefing
by Evgeny Velikhov,
became willing to talk.. That was the beginning of the end of the cold
war.(8)
One of the most sensible conversations between USSR and USA was
when Secretary
Krushchev discussed matters with President Eisenhower. "Do you also
have problems with your
military industrial complex?". Indeed they both did and the USA still
has. Eisenhower
described the dangers a year or so later in a farewell speech at the
end of his Presidency.(9)
Although funding for the ABM decreased at the end of the Reagan
presidency it did not stop. The military - industrial complex was, and
is, too powerful. Recognizing the strong US pressure, not from
scientists, to build an
ABM system Dr
Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute,
proposed to President
Yeltsin that the USA and USSR build an ABM system jointly,
but only jointly(10) This would
have been taking President Reagan's offer to share the technology to
its obvious conclusion. . I am told that President Yeltsin made such an
informal approach but got nowhere. The push for
an ABM system did not completely stop during the Clinton
administration, but it was not till
December 13, 2001, that President George W. Bush gave Russia notice of
the United States'
withdrawal from the ABM treaty, in accordance with the clause that
requires six months notice
before terminating the pact, but reversing 30 years of US policy.. The
withdrawal took effect on
June 13th 2002. I presume this was to satisfy domestic
politics. Although, in international law,
the US had a right to withdraw, this was the first time in recent
history the United States has
withdrawn from a major international arms treaty. This led to the
eventual creation of the Missile
Defense Agency(11). The withdrawal had
many critics, including most scientists. John
Rhinelander, a negotiator of the ABM treaty, predicted that the
withdrawal would be a "fatal
blow" to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and would lead to a
"world without effective legal
constraints on nuclear proliferation."(12)
But the direction has changed. It is important to realize that the
argument that anyone
who can afford a missile can afford decoys applies not only to states,
but non state actors. Some
people would say rogue organizations, but, alas, states can be rogues
also. The most dangerous
aspect of supporting an anti ballistic missile program is to deceive
one's own people that a
technical solution exists for a problem that cries out for a far
sighted diplomacy. Recognizing
that the problems of the release of multiple decoys once the missile
has reached altitude, the
ABM proposers have concentrated on intercepting the missile in the
"boost phase" before it has
reached altitude and released its decoys. It has been proposed that
decoys could only usefully
be released when the missile had reached cruising altitude and that an
ABM system might work
in the boost (launch) launch phase. Indeed there are a couple of
minutes in which an incoming
missile can be identified and an anti ballistic missile launched to
reach the missile in the "boost
phase" - about 4 minutes. But there are severe constraints. The ABM
system must be capable
of a far more complex calculation than heretofore performed in that
short time. It has been said
in jest that one must not leave this up to Microsoft who seem incapable
of making "Windows"
error proof. Moreover the launch of the anti-ballistic missile must be
within a couple of hundred
miles of the launch of the ballistic missile itself. An APS study
explicitly addressed possible
sites near North Korea and Iran, widely believed to be potential
problems and even called part of
the "Axis of Evil" by President Bush. This was studied in a special
study group of the American
Physical Society.(13) I attach the
principal findings of that study as an appendix.
In 2007 President Bush proposed an ABM system in the Czech republic and
Poland. It
is completely unclear why, of all the countries in the world that these
two were proposed. If
all the complex technical problems were solved, this could address a
launch from Ukraine,
Belarus or European Russia, or even Germany or Austria, but not for
Iran or North Korea. countries of present (US) concern. It is hard to
perceive any logic behind this. Is it meant to
scare Russia? Russian scientists like Nikolai Ponamarev-Stepnoy
understand well that it has no
real technical merit. Russia is vast, and could easily send missiles,
with decoys from the Urals,
in the same way that Stalin built (with help from US engineers) the
steel industry at
Magnitogorsk which during world War II could not be attacked by any
outside enemy. It is,
perhaps the inverse of Stalin's famous comment to the Japanese Prime
Minister in the 1930s:
"Tokyo is closer to Moscow that Moscow is to Tokyo". Mr Putin could
easily have shrugged it
all off and said publicly that this shows President Bush and his
advisors to be technically
incompetent. But he chose not to do so. Instead he repeated the Yeltsin
proposal for a joint
ABM system, and slyly suggested that it be in Azerbaijan, a country
over which Russia has
considerable influence. This would be close to Iran. This is about the
only system that might
make technical sense.
It is hard to see what all of this means. I know little about the
way Mr Putin thinks, but I
assume that for him, just as much or more than for President Bush
domestic considerations took
priority. It might well be hard for him to tell the Russian people that
an ABM system on
Russia's borders is not a threat to Russia's survival, and is merely a
colossal waste of money by a
stupid US administration. Why should we make it hard for Putin to tell
the Russian people that
the USA is not a threat? On the US side, scientific integrity and
common sense is now a rarity in
Washington and the advisors such as my brother-(in-law)2
Pief Panofsky calls the US nuclear
posture as proceeding from Mutually Assured Destruction (Mad) to
"Nuclear Use Target
Selection" (NUTS)(14).
But there is another view of the effectiveness of the 1983 SDI
proposal, that was
expressed by Dr Lowell Wood, a scientist from Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory who was close
to Edward Teller, in Erice in August 2002. He accepted that the ABM
system was ineffective
because of decoys, but nonetheless the USA nonetheless was able to
persuade the USSR, already
saddled with a military budget about 40% of GDP, to spend on an ABM
system. According to
Lowell, the USA also used, during 1983-1987, economic tactics to delay
the Russian-French
gas pipeline, thereby depriving them of foreign currency. This,
together with Gorbachev's
"Glasnost", forced the collapse of the Soviet system. Indeed, while
most westerners date the
fall of USSR to December 1991 when Chairman of the Belarus Supreme
Soviet Stanislaw
Suskevich invited President Kravchuk of the Ukraine to Minsk, or August
1991 when there was
the abortive army push against Gorbachev, President Ter-Petrossian of
Armenia told me
privately that the fall of the system began in January 1991 when the
Communist parties in the
peripheral republic stopped paying their dues to the central party(15). By the end of the year the
Communist party was bankrupt. It is hard to argue that this retroactive
view of the complex
diplomacy is not partially correct. Indeed Reagan and Teller may have
themselves believed that
SDI would be ineffective and deliberately misled the USSR. . But I
doubt that the leaders of
Russia and their military industria complex, will be stampeded again by
the USA into
overspending on an arms race. I prefer to be a little frightened by the
indications that my
country, the USA is playing a dangerous game of allowing domestic
politics to control its
approach to nuclear weapons control and the danger of annihilating the
human race.
In summation, while I would much prefer that no country make an ABM
system, even for
the boost phase, Putin's proposal makes more sense than Bush's..
1. 1. E.g. Edward Teller "Better a
shield than a sword." The Free press, NY 1987.
2. 2. H.A Bethe and R.L. Garwin,
Ani-Ballistic Missile Systems Scientific American 218(3):21-31
1968
3. 3. My late brother, Flight
Lieutenant Lawrence Wilson, who never flew an airplane, was a radar
officer and a part of this deception..
4. 4. The Collapse of The Soviet
Military, William E. Odom, Yale University Press, 1998
5. 5. Andropov's comments are in
Pravda. March 27, 1983
6. 6. N. Bloembergen and C. K. N.
Patel, et al. Science and Technology of Directed Energy
Weapons, Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 59, No. 3, Part II, pp.
S1-S202 (1987),
7. 7. As the title of a little
pamphlet I wrote at the time.
8. 8. Rough estimates based on arms
control journals
9. 9.
http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/indust.html
10. 10. Stated to Richard Wilson by
Nikolai Ponamarev-Stepnoy orally in June 2007
11. 11.
http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/abm/ad_mou.htm
12. 12. J.B. Rhinelander, Journal of
Conflict and Security Law, Volume 6, Number 1, 1 June 2001 ,
pp. 91-114(24), Oxford University Press
13. 13. D. K. Barton et al,
The APS study on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile
Defense Reviews of Modern Physics. Rev. Mod. Phys. 76.
S1 (2004).
14. 14. W.K.H Panofsky,
"Nuclear Weapons: Security or Insecurity?" talk at Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center, March
12th 2007
15. 15. Personal communication after
a talk at the Kennedy School of Government.
Subsequent comment: My brother (in-law)^2, "Pief"
Panofsky, died of a heart attack on September 24th 2007. On
September 26th the SanFrancisco Chronicle published an ope-ed by him
entitled "Missiles, no defense". This reminded me of his
first sttement on the subject on in Congressional Testimony in
1969. For 38 years he has argued in all availvailable fora
against ABMs.
Let us hope that Pief's last words will
be heeded.