The
potential for nuclear power.
Richard Wilson
<>
<>Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics
<>
<>Harvard University
<>
<>Director, NE Regional Center of National Institute for Global
Environmental Change (NIGEC)
Talk at Symposium on:
"Global Energy Strategies:
"Living with Restricted Greenhouse Emissions."
<>
<>Organized by Center for
Environmental Information, Rochester, NY
<>in Washington, D.C.
<>
<>Tuesday December 8th 1992
Introduction:
The technology of nuclear
fission
I have been asked to discuss the potential for nuclear power
in the years ahead, because generating power from nuclear fission
does not lead to emission of greenhouse gases; and therefore
replacement of any fossil fuel electricity generating plant by a
nuclear one will reduce emission of greenhouse gases. In a talk
given to this group three years ago, (Wilson 1989) I showed that
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by changing from fossil
fuels to nuclear power, and the reduction of emission of greenhouse
gases by improvement of end use efficiency (loosely called energy
conservation) are independent of each other. Both can be partially
effective. It is stupid to reject either because it will not do
the whole job. If the effect of rising greenhouse gas
concentrations is as bad as most scientists fear, both are
necessary. In particular I took some leading energy supply
projections, and showed how simple modifications could lead to more
nuclear power and fewer greenhouse gas emissions than otherwise.
(figures 1 and 2)
In order to understand the present position of nuclear fission
power, it is important to understand a few features about the
technology and how it differs from fossil fuel burning. I will
take natural gas as an example for comparison, because it is
natural gas that has been compared with nuclear energy in several
recent societal decisions; yet natural gas is a greenhouse gas, and
when burnt produces a greenhouse gas.
Natural gas is brought from the well to the user by pipeline
to wherever the user wants it - his power plant or his kitchen
stove. At the end of the pipe he/she can light a match and get
instant heat at the right place. The convenience is almost as
great as using electricity. The burner is simple and needs little
maintenance. For electricity generation, the recent development of
"combined cycle" burners for base load leads to a thermodynamic
efficiency of 53% which is 50% higher than the average (35%) for
all fossil fuel generators. Moreover, there is a possibility in
the future for direct use in fuel cells with an even greater
efficiency.
The amount of useful energy in one gram of uranium is 2
million times that in one gram of natural gas. This simplifies
transportation of the fuel, but it makes the use of it more
complex. While on an atomic scale, the nuclear fission is a
simpler process than combustion, it is hard to exploit this
simplicity in technical devices. Small nuclear fission reactors
have been made that need no attention for months or years; the
reactors in USSR satellites are examples. But because of the
energy density there is a chance that something can go wrong and
cause large problems. The main complexity and cost of nuclear
power is in coping with this safety problem, whether by initial
design, by responding to critics, or by "onerous" regulation.
Nuclear fuel is cheap, and it is plentiful even at present
prices. The plentiful nature of the supply has not always been
apparent; when nuclear energy was expanding rapidly world-wide in
1965 to 1975, it was feared that the uranium would soon become
scarce. But a modification of the technology with a breeder
reactor, will enable an almost unlimited amount of fuel to be
available at an affordable cost; Many people have estimated for
example that we can count on 100,000 years supply at the present
world energy consumption using a breeder reactor. (Wilson 1972) Present
estimates are, however that it will not be needed before
the year 2020 and maybe not then. In this paper therefore I will
not discuss the fuel supply in any detail. Nuclear fuel has a
considerable advantage over fossil fuels; it is cheap to transport
the limited amount of fuel actually needed, so that provided that
nations engage in international trade, every nation that wishes has
equal access to nuclear fuel.
Natural gas is also plentiful. The world reserves of 120
trillion cubic feet has trebled in the last 10 years and are enough
for 60 years consumption at today's rates.
The cost of nuclear energy
Nuclear energy was once cheap, and competitive with coal, oil
and gas generation. Now it seems to be expensive. In order to
understand what the cost might be in the future, it is therefore
important to understand what has changed and why it has changed.
Unfortunately this is not easy.
Following Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech in 1953, there
was euphoria about nuclear energy. It seemed to offer an
unlimited, environmentally benign, source of energy to pull mankind
out of poverty for ever. In 1970 it was also cheap; the busbar
cost was 0.55 c/kwh from Connecticut Yankee, and 0.828 c/kwh from
Yankee Rowe, although as noted below there was some federal
subsidy for construction. By 1980 this had all changed. Some
environmentalists were actively opposing nuclear energy, and costs
had escalated. This escalation has continued for the last 12
years. What had happened? Can we return either to the enthusiasm
or the low cost? Should we try to return? I will spend most of
the talk discussing these questions, and illustrating alternative
courses for society, particularly U.S. society.
Capital Cost
The facts of the increases in cost are well documented, but
not the reasons therefor. In 1961 Yankee Rowe cost $40 million to
build for an initial 120 MWe installed capacity which was expanded
to 185 Mwe. In 1966 Connecticut Yankee cost $120,000,000 to
$160,000,000 (depending upon one's estimate of the value of
government subsidies) for 550 MWe ($220 to $290 per kwe
installed). In 1972 Maine Yankee cost $200,000,000 for $800 MWe
also $250 per kw installed. But this cost was increased 10% when
Maine Yankee was forced to spend an extra $20 million to revise the
cooling water system to meet environmental objections that had been
raised after the initial design had passed the construction public
hearing. This increase was just the beginning. Now even the best
plants cost $2000 per kwe installed. This increase far exceeds the
threefold inflation since 1972. The operating costs have also
increased so that whereas in 1970 nuclear produced electricity was
competitive with that from oil and coal, in 1990 it had become
slightly more expensive; even though the cost of using oil and
coal also increased in this period. This runs counter
to all previous experience. One expects
that costs will come down as the new technology is learnt! The
costs of most technologies have followed a "learning curve"; with
nuclear power we seem to have a "forgetting curve"! A learning
curve is evident in subsets of the nuclear data; the later nuclear
power plants built by Duke Power cost less than the earlier ones. But
superimposed is an overall societal increase of cost.
What had happened? A part of the
problem is a general
increase in construction costs. But unless the utility company
accountants were lying on a massive scale in 1972, I can see only
one main reason; a changed perception of the need for expenditure
on safety, which is the main determinant of cost.
Some people claim that utility companies routinely added
equipment and personnel when pressured by Public Utility
Commissions, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and environmental
advocates without regard to cost. I am unable to contradict them. It is
unclear whether increased cost led to improved safety.
A part of the increase in construction cost is due to interest
charged on capital during the construction period. Interest rates
have increased because of inflation since 1970; total interest
charges have also increased because of delays. The delays in turn
have been due in part to increased licensing requirements, (yet
some older plants have had retrofit and the cost of those does not
make up the difference in cost) a part is from public opposition,
and a part may be due to construction by less competent utility
companies. There is a wide variation in these cost increases,
sometimes, but not always, associated with public opposition. A
part, but not all, of this cost increase has appeared in other
non-nuclear construction projects. A proposal 8 years ago that the
National Academy of Sciences study this question came to naught. Those
closest to industry seemed not to want to know the answers,
because in many cases it could be embarrassing. Since we do not
know for certain the reasons for this increase in cost, it is hard
to predict when or even whether the costs will decrease again.
Following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1978, the
staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were insisting on design
changes (in the name of safety) that no other industry has had to
suffer; in some cases opposition that arose after the initial order
(with its' construction permit hearing) has raised issues already
technically decided and prevented operation after construction.
delays were caused by protracted hearings before the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Boards (ASLB) with very little substance. These
changes and delays, led to unanticipated increases in construction
cost. Public Utility Commissions hold "prudency hearings" to
decide whether any particular expenditure was prudent. While it
seems reasonable that utility companies be prudent, this concept is
not evenly applied. For capital construction public utility
commissions have declared that the utility company should have been
able to avoid cost overruns, including some caused by opposition or
excessive regulatory requirements. They have refused to allow the
utilities to recover their investment, in decisions that are almost
unique to the nuclear industry (Wells, 1989), (NAS, 1992).
In contrast to the effect of prudency hearings in discouraging
construction, the "fuel adjustment charge", which becomes an ever
larger part of my electricity bill, ensures that even if the
utility company was imprudent and projected a fuel cost for oil or
gas that is too small, they can recover all of the increase
from
the customer. With gas they are even better off. In the early
1980s many gas distribution companies signed "take or pay"
contracts with suppliers. Prices were high and shortages were
threatened; the courts have allowed the companies to walk out on
their contracts!
Operating Costs
The increase in capital cost for a nuclear power plant
discussed above became very evident in the 1980s and has received
a lot of attention. But far more insidious has been a steady
increase in "Operations and Maintenance" (O and M) costs. Leading
nuclear scientists told the nuclear industry at the beginning of
this last decade that "if you operate the nuclear power plants
safely for the next 20 years, all will be well". They were overly
optimistic and ignored the effect of increasing costs. Several
events in the last year bring to our attention the effects of this
ignoring of the operating costs. In Figure 3 I show how the total
cost of operating Yankee Rowe has changed over the years. Before
1970 the cost was mainly pay back of the "loan" or charge against
capital. The 1970 cost of 0.82c/kwh is equivalent to a little over
2c/kwh in the 1992 dollars plotted here. The charge for
construction cost must have gone down; utility company practice has
been to charge the construction cost early; moreover inflation must
have diluted the payments. But the operating costs went up;
(figure 4) this has been due to safety improvements demanded by NRC
and also to an increase in Operations and Maintenance. A clue
comes in the plot (figure 5) of the staffing of the plant. The
number of employees went up threefold over this time. I do not
have a further breakdown but it has been claimed that a large part
of the increase in employees was due to increase in the number of
security guards (which may or may not have been accompanied by an
increase in security). Here the treatment of energy sources is
unequal. My local LNG facility has few, if any, guards till a
shipment comes, and the 500 MWe hydroelectric (Comerford) dam is
completely unguarded. I am able to drive my car out upon it
unnoticed, and could lower a 1000 lb bomb over the side. Yet this
much modern explosive could rupture the dam and carry away all the
dams downstream, and many communities along the Connecticut river. This
is not an idle speculation. In 1944 a hydroelectric dam in
Germany was destroyed by a single 500 lb bomb; placed in position
under unfavorable circumstances. It was dropped from the air
against intense anti-aircraft fire and the best nets to stop
torpedoes and bombs that Germany could devise. How much easier
it would be with no opposition! In 1975 a study of California dams
made by a group of scientists in UCLA (Ayyaswami 1974) showed that
there are no evacuation plans, and in the event of a severe
earthquake, many thousands of people could be killed.
In figure 6 I show an average of O and M costs for the
industry as a whole. Even over the last few years, O and M costs
have increased at over 3% a year! Although they seem to be
flattening off, it would be a bold man who will say that O and M
costs will not increase again. A part has been due to pressure
tube failures in Westinghouse's steam generators. A close
examination shows considerable variation among plants, suggesting
that there are technical matters, such as corrosion that can
contribute in many cases (Hansen et. al. 1979). This variation
between plants has also been emphasized by Mahoney (1992). In my
introduction I stated that much of the cost of nuclear power was
because of the necessity of a safe controlled reaction. It
follows then that much of this increase of O an M costs is in some
way related to safety; whether from an increased industry
perception of the need for safety; whether from direct to responses
to regulation or a decrease in efficiency of addressing safety
concerns. It also follows from the variation in such costs among
plants that some plants are likely to be more expensive than using
alternate fuels and are vulnerable to attack on this ground.
The antinuclear strategy
Already in 1970 the nuclear euphoria of 1953 was not
universal. Other views began to be expressed. Various scientists,
including Dr Ernest Sternglass, Dr John Gofman, Dr Thomas Mancuso,
and Dr Karl Morgan had already attacked atomic bombs and
exaggerated the effects of radiation on man in order to do so. At
the meeting of the American Association for Advancement in Science
the then President, Nobel Laureate Glenn Seaborg was picketed. Not
for his part in making the atomic bomb, or his work as Chairman of
the AEC in assisting in Kennedy's build up of nuclear weapons, but
because of his espousal of nuclear electric power. Professional
societies, with a notable exception of a strong disagreement with
the expressed views of Dr Sternglass by several past Presidents of
the Health Physics Society, were silent. The public organizations
that engage in research on the effects of radiation, the National
Cancer Institute (NCI), the National Council on Radiological
Protection (NCRP), and even the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP), did little to contain the
hysteria. The scientific and technical community were, and still
are, silent in spite of an eloquent appeal by an English health
physicist Dr Rotblat. This left the field wide open to extremists
who were willing to distort the truth. Too few scientists were,
and are, willing to speak up in public for scientific truth and
process. Lay people therefore rally to the side that is open and
enthusiastic.
<> By 1975, antinuclear activists had begun their steady, and
presently successful in the USA, attacks. It is instructive to
understand their methods. Although the public hearing process for
individual power plants leaves more opportunity for intervention
than for other power plants, it is continuously attacked as being
not open enough. Studies made by government, industry, academia
and non profit groups continually show that nuclear power is more
benign than coal or oil burning (IAEA 1991). This led Ralph Nader
15 years ago to propose his successful strategy of using delays in
the legal system to make nuclear power too expensive; this included
the strategy of controlling the local public utility commissions.
As Nader said early on: "We may lose every battle in the hearings,
but we will win the war." The US legal system is particularly
suited to such tactics. Few, if any, courts are willing to admit
that delay, in itself, can deprive people of their legal rights.
Yet justice delayed is justice denied.
The Director's Dilemma
The success of the US antinuclear power movement by 1983 is
apparent in several ways. One may be summarized in the oft quoted
"Director's Dilemma" One imagines a Director of a utility company
who is convinced that, in the long run nuclear power is:
- cheaper than all alternatives
- environmentally superior to all alternatives
- a better neighbor than alternative power plants
- in the public interest.
Nonetheless he will not order a power plant unless he knows:
- what the power plant will consist of when he orders it
- that he knows what the power plant will cost to build and operate
- that he will be allowed to complete it when he has ordered it
- that when it is finished he will be allowed to operate it
- that when he operates it he will be allowed to recover his
investment.
These seem like simple and obvious requirements, which are met
in almost all industries. In 1970 a utility executive knew all of
these things, or thought he did. By 1980 he knew none of them.
All of these requirements, and the costs, depend critically
upon the political situation which in turn is associated with the
fact that many members of the public do not understand and
consequently fear this new technology. They do not know, and
scientists forget to remind them, the simple scientific fact about
nuclear fission that lead to a huge differences in technological
possibilities between nuclear and fossil fuels that the energy
density is 3 million times as great; it takes three million times
the weight of coal to produce a certain amount of energy as of
uranium 235. This difference is the difference between chemical and
nuclear energy densities. This difference enables mankind to make
bombs a million times more powerful than before. Whereas in the
second world war, a 50 pound bomb often destroyed a house, and a
"blockbuster" had 2 tons of TNT we glibly talk about bombs with a
hundred million times the explosive power. Many scientists believe
that the connection with bombs is the most important impediment to
nuclear power. It is, however, important to realize that these
bombs can be, have been, and probably will be made whether or not
the world decides to use nuclear fission for peaceful purposes.
The difference in energy density between nuclear and fossil
technologies enables many environmental advantages to be achieved. The
quantity of fuel is small enough that we can afford to
chemically purify the uranium both before burning, and after
burning: which is not possible for fossil fuel burning. Although
the waste products are highly toxic, they can be kept concentrated
and their volume kept small. The waste products from fossil fuel,
particularly coal, burning are also toxic, and their volume is
inevitably a million times larger. The TOTAL toxicity is comparable
- initially somewhat more for nuclear, but somewhat less after the
radioactivity decays. People are often confused; they correctly
attribute to high level nuclear waste a high specific toxicity
(toxicity per unit weight), but forget that there is much smaller
quantity! Indeed, as I have noted many times, this means that
nuclear waste is the only waste in society for which we have a
reasonable solution! But this is not the general perception of the
public. It is vital to realize that the concentration of the
nuclear waste is an advantage - but an advantage that can be thrown
away by an inappropriate public emphasis. The public should be
emphasizing that the waste must be kept concentrated; and this
advantage not negated by faulty handling such as at Hanford.
A committee set up by the Forum of Science and Society of the
American Physical Society stated that: (Hebel 1978) "we anticipate
no difficulty in locating several suitable sites in different
geological media within the immediate future". Immediate appeared
to mean before 1985! They emphasized that it is an institutional
and political problem, in which technologists can help, rather than
a technical one in which politicians can help. Such a realization
could spur people to search for those peoples or places where it is
politically desirable to accept nuclear waste. The tentative offer
of the Peoples' Republic of China, in exchange for help in
construction of nuclear power plants, to allow nuclear waste
disposal in the Gobi desert (for a fee) may well be one of these
possible solutions.
Scientists were aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
nuclear fission as they returned from the second World War in 1945.
The perceived advantages drove them to develop nuclear energy. For
a while they achieved widespread public acceptance for their point
of view. The Joint Committee of Atomic Energy of the US Congress
ensured bipartisan political support. Now, however, and many in
the public are suspicious of scientists. The joint committee was
disbanded and fifteen committees vie for the task of controlling
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and criticizing its' activities.
Moreover there is world wide an anti-scientific trend: described
eloquently by Kapitsa (1991).
In these circumstances, the fastest route to early retirement
for a utility company president would be proposing a nuclear power
plant. However, any one proposing a new gas plant, can be sure
that he can make money, once the plant has been approved. I
repeat what I said widely in 1975. We are not sure of the cost of
nuclear electric power. It obviously can be as low as it was in
1972, and could probably (due to learning) be somewhat lower. But
antinuclear activists can, if we let them, force the cost to rise
without limit. This is one of the many situations in which I am
sorry to be right.
The role of the states.
The Atomic Energy Act preempts state legislation in the fields
that it covers, particularly safety including radiation safety.
However, many states have nibbled away at this. For example it is
clear that California reserves the right for itself to determine
the adequacy of any procedure for nuclear waste disposal.
(California 1976). While accepting the principle of federal
preemption, the US Supreme Court has accepted the constitutionality
of California's law in a decision which puzzled many observers. Tribe
(1983) called it "a total victory for the states". The best
discussion of this whittling away of federal authority is given by
Pasternak and Budnitz (1987). The state role remains preeminent in
items of cost and price and is typically controlled through public
utility commissions (PUCs) which are very sensitive to local
political issues. The California waste disposal law was accepted
by the Supreme Court as constitutional because it allowed the PUC
to exercise economic
control. It did not however, prevent the
economic investment by state utilities in cross border power
plants. (e.g Palo Verde in Arizona). This decision reinforced the
view of many who questioned the wisdom of nuclear power and
realized early on that the states could prevent nuclear power
whatever the federal government decides on safety.
I now illustrate the way in which PUCs can shut down complete
and operable power plants by discussing several cases where this
has happened. I do not possess enough detail on any of them to
call them "case studies" in any formal sense; indeed enough
information is hard to acquire. Therefore some of the views here
expressed should be considered more as questions for others to
answer than rigorously derived conclusions.
Shoreham
The Shoreham nuclear power plant of Long Island Lighting
Company was proposed about 1972; interestingly enough, the request
for licensing was within a few days of a request for a construction
permit for a similar boiling water reactor at Millstone Point -
just across Long Island Sound. There were delays in obtaining a
construction permit at Shoreham; the application came a few days
after a moratorium caused by the adverse Calvert Cliffs decision,
(causing an 18 month delay) and there were costly mistakes in
construction so that over $6 billion was finally spent on a plant
that cost NE Utilities $425 million at Millstone Point! Although
the engineers and the federal (NRC) regulators felt that the plant
had successfully surmounted these hurdles and was safe, the loss of
public confidence led to the demise of the plant. The county, who
had originally supported the plant at Shoreham, changed their minds
and opposed it. An opportunity came to block the plant when the
NRC (1980) issued a new regulation which insisted that the local
community approve the emergency plan as a condition of an operating
license. Both the county and the state declined to approve the
plan, and held up the operation of the plant. After several years
delay, NRC prevented this effective "veto" by the local community
and the state by modifying the regulation.
But in the intervening years the Governor and PUC made an
offer Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) could not refuse. The
state would buy the plant for $1; they could declare the plant a
"tax loss" and get back an appreciable fraction of the
extraordinarily high cost of the plant against the federal tax
bill, and the rest against electricity rates. Although the federal
taxpayer paid a fraction of the original cost (inflated by
inefficiencies and delays) they paid almost as much as the plant
was worth! From the point of view of the LILCO ratepayers, this
seemed ideal. The one scientist in Congress, Representative Don
Ritter, tried to stop the allowance of the tax benefit, firstly by
asking the IRS to rule it invalid and then by a special bill. It
seemed to him that it was a terrible precedent to allow someone to
abandon it as an imprudent investment when the plant could in fact
work economically once sunk costs were ignored. Several citizens of
Long Island, joined by the US Department of Energy, tried
unsuccessfully to force the state to write an Environmental Impact
Statement so that the environmental costs could be publicly
presented and properly considered. (The local Shoreham school
committee continued to support continued operation until a hole was
drilled in the reactor vessel to ensure that no one could change
their minds). It is noteworthy that the alternate source of
electricity is the burning of oil or natural gas. In the cost
comparisons no allowance was made for the environmental cost of
emission of greenhouse gases.
Yankee Rowe
I have mentioned before that Yankee Rowe produced cheap
electricity in New England in 1970 at 0.95c/kwh (about 2 cents/kwh
in 1992 dollars). But it was also an old plant. By 1991 the
costs had risen to 7.1 cents/kwh. In summer 1991 concerns were
raised by NRC staff and others. "Had the reactor vessel become
dangerously brittle from neutron bombardment?" The NRC staff
originally agreed with carefully argued presentation by Yankee
Atomic Corporation, the owner of the power plant that it had not. But
after intervention by a group critical of nuclear safety, the
Union of Concerned Scientists, (UCS) who also claimed that Yankee
Rowe a lot more dangerous than more recent plants, this was
reviewed. This review was encouraged by the new Chairman of the
Commission, Dr Selin, who apparently wanted to make his name as a
tough regulator. The plant was shut down while new tests were to
be conducted. These new tests were to cost only $28 million
(Kadak, 1992), (less than 0.1 cents/kwh amortized over 20 years)
but the utility felt no confidence that the tests would actually
satisfy the NRC, and that more would not be demanded - particularly at
the time of license renewal in 2001. A
calculation suggested that over the next ten years other sources of
electricity would be cheaper. Although not stated it is likely
that natural gas (or oil) will effectively be the replacement
(although a new coal fired cogeneration plant of the same size as
Yankee Rowe has just been approved for Eastern Massachussets)
I note that no allowance was made in the comparison for the
environmental cost of the emission of greenhouse gases, and no one
protested on behalf of environmental diversity or preservation of
the habitat of Canadian Indians when New England proposed to buy
hydropower from Hydro Quebec.
An interesting facet is that if Yankee Atomic, the owner of
the plant, had spent the $28 million on studies and still not been
allowed to operate again, the costs might be called imprudent and
then the company might not collect from the ratepayers. If the
studies had been made while the plant was operating, a different
situation would have prevailed and they might have decided
differently.
This is an example of a general case; plants should not be shut
down while studies are made unless there is a real safety
emergency.
San Onofre I
San Onofre I (SONGSI) is a 500 MWe reactor which has been
operational since 1968. It has just completed a record continuous
run without shut down for maintenance. It comes to the attention of
the California PUC when NRC insisted on $150 million in capital
improvements (to make it more earthquake resistant) in 1980. The
alternative considered was to shut down and use natural gas using
a new combined cycle generating plant. Various scenarios can be
made about future prices, but if it is assumed that O and M costs
for nuclear power continue to rise, and natural gas prices do not
rise for the next 6 years, (figure 7) shut down becomes economic.
The California PUC had suggested that Southern California
Edison run San Onofre I as an Independent Power Producer (IPP). They
declined. Presumably they would sell the power plant for $1,
and even make an adjustment for costs of decommissioning. If the
PUC are wrong in their economic forecasts, anyone who buys and
operates such a plant will make money. Where are the pronuclear
millionaires who can afford to make such a gamble? Alas, it seems
that the only pronuclear people left are a few crazy, starry-eyed
academics with no money!
The California Energy Commission and the PUC staff had
recommended that environmental issues be taken into account in such
comparisons. However, no allowance was made by PUC for the
greenhouse gases emitted by the replacement power plant. If it had
been made, the balance would have thrown the decision the other
way
Trojan
The Trojan nuclear power plant in Oregon has a larger capacity
than either of these (1130 Mwe) and the economic factors might be
thought to be superior. However the management of PGE have made a
"final" decision to close Trojan at the end of its current fuel
load in 1996 (Trojan, 1996). Again, however, the continued
operation of Trojan was compared with new combined cycle gas
generation and, on the assumption of a 1.5% yearly increase in O
and M costs from 1993 to 1996 and 3% above 1996, leading to another
doubling of costs by 2017, but little rise in gas prices, was found
wanting.
These may seem unreasonable 0 and M projections. In a
revealing comment PGE explicitly say "what was ultimately chosen
was a compromise between the plant's input and other interested
parties inputs" (Heintzmann, 1992). Although Trojan claims
externalities have been figured in,
inadequate allowance has been made for the environmental costs of
emitting greenhouse gases. It also appears that the scenario
assuming spot prices of natural gas has already been shown to be
defective by the doubling of the spot price after the hurricane in
September 1992 forced the temporary closure of several off-shore
gas wells.
What allowance should be made for the emission of greenhouse
gases? In a paper I presented at an earlier conference in this
series I discussed this question. (Wilson 1988) Many economists
have done so also. Economists discuss a "tax" on carbon of $40/ton
(Nordhaus, 1991), (Jorgensen and Wilcoxen, 1990). If allowance is
made for the different amounts of CO2 produced, this will
amount to
0.08c per cu ft of natural gas, or about 0.6c/kwh of electricity
with 50% efficiency. This was proposed by Ross Perot during the
presidential elections and it is not improbable that it will be
imposed during the next ten years. Although 0.6c/kwh seems small
it would turn the PUC decisions around in some cases.
In this PGE ignored an additional important point (Heintzmann
1992). CH4 is a greenhouse gas which is 23 times as
important,
molecule for molecule, as C02. Even if 4% of the gas leaks
anywhere
between the well and the power plant the effect (together with an
assumed tax) is doubled to 1.1c/kwh. An English study, (Grubb
1991) suggests that a 10% leakage rate is possible. Moreover
sometimes CO2 comes out of the well with the gas. In one
field in
Indonesia, which may well be supplying California, four CO2
molecules come out for every CH4 molecule, multiplying the
effect
by a factor of 4! The Oregon Public Utility Commission (OPUC 1992)
explicitly opted to ignore this also.
Should we resurrect the nuclear
option?
Is the success of this antinuclear strategy a great success of
mankind over those who would misuse the forces of nature, or is a
stupid refusal of mankind to understand the physical world in which
we live, and to use God's bounty for the benefit of all mankind? It has
been common for antinuclear activists to state that opposing
nuclear power is not a technical but a moral issue, and that
nuclear power is an intrusive evil. I suggest that while admitting
that nuclear power may pose more moral issues than technical ones,
it should be considered immoral to willfully oppose a technology
that can improve the living standards of a number of the world's
poor. Nobel Laureate Andrei Dmitreyvich Sakharov, speaking at the
"Forum for a Nuclear Free World" in Moscow in February 1987,
reproved his German "Green" colleagues. He suggested that instead
of opposing nuclear energy, they work to make it safer; because the
world will need nuclear energy as it strives to help the developing
countries.
The mixing of Bombs and Power
plants
In 1946 nuclear physicists and others returning from the war,
did not want the atomic bomb to be under military control, and
insisted upon a civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to oversee
all uses of nuclear fission. This decision, however useful it may
have been in controlling military excesses, laid deep problems for
peaceful uses. For many years, military uses, and military habits
of secrecy, influenced the Commission. A myth arose that bombs and
nuclear power stations are inseparable, even though most power
station engineers know less than many bright undergraduates about
how to make a bomb, and no nation has ever used a nuclear power
program in the quest for nuclear weapons. This mixing has led to
official secrecy and a confusion of thought eagerly exploited by a
few antinuclear scientists.
There is no doubt that the system and the people who are
knowledgeable about a nuclear fuel cycle can be used to plan and
build a fuel cycle for bomb making. But such people can also
prevent clandestine bomb making. This is a vital issue which
needs
far more discussion then I can give here.
In discussing nuclear safety, a committee of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (REF) discussed two levels of
accident probability; firstly a tolerable limit above which the
technology should not proceed. The law, as interpreted by the US
Supreme court In Silkwood (1984) clearly says that "the promotion
of nuclear power is not to be accomplished 'at all costs'". The
Chernobyl accident clearly exceeded this. Secondly there is a "de
minimis" limit where the accident is generally regarded as
impossible, and needs no further thought. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the nuclear industry have been addressing the
second, de minimis, level. But it could be argued that if the
alternative is the closing of an acceptably safe nuclear power
plant, should not the comparison be to the safety of the
alternative technology calculated in a similar way? This is not
done at the present time.
It is paradoxical that two states which have been leaders in
urging "least cost" energy planning, New York and California,
rejected a request from citizens and others, including the Council
for Environmental Quality, that they prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement for the proposed dismantling of Shoreham and
Rancho Seco although the stated purpose of an environmental impact
statement is similar to the least cost energy plan. New York and
California fought the requests in court (and won). This has led to
speculation that the call by these PUCs for consideration of
environmental factors is insincere; as presently applied they must
be mentioned, but are not included in any decision. Would the
present uses of fossil fuels satisfy the published "safety goals"
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission if an appropriately
conservative view is taken of the effects of air pollution, or of
the likelihood of war as we squabble over the price of oil?
Even natural gas, which is the particular fuel in the
comparisons above, is not completely benign. There is a long list
of risky locations; from accidents in drilling; fires on off-shore
rigs; pipeline explosions, and explosions at the end user. Supermarkets
have been destroyed in the dead of night; and if the
contents of a typical LNG tank were mixed stoichiometrically with
air, and ignited, the explosion would be the size of 20 Hiroshima
bombs. Colgate's (1974) scenario of the hazard of natural gas
getting into sewers, by evil intent or otherwise, was laughed at. It is
similar to an accident that occurred in Mexico recently and
has never been properly considered. Bad operation, similar to that
at Chernobyl, caused an accident in the trans-siberian pipeline in
1987 which incinerated 300 passengers on a passing train. These
and other accidents happened with Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
which is heavier than air. It is likely that for LNG which is
lighter than air except when in large quantities in a cold cloud,
the accident probability is much less. Nonetheless, this is rarely
argued.
Public Utility Commissions often now demand "Least Cost"
energy planning. While it is far from clear that the procedures
specified lead to a lower cost than the procedures that they
replaced, "least cost" plans are supposed to ensure that all
factors are considered including environmental factors. But in all
the cases above, the main environmental concern about natural gas,
the potential increase of the greenhouse effect, was ignored or
incorrectly calculated.
Comparisons of environmental hazards have been numerous in the
last 20 years. I note in particular three studies: by a French
"colloque" (SFDN 1980) by Ottinger (1991) and by an expert
symposium of a dozen UN agencies (IAEA 1991), Ottinger's study
(figure 8) assumes a Chernobyl-type nuclear accident every few
decades - an assumption that no expert would make. However, I
include it here as an example of a study that corresponds to public
perceptions; that has been used, and will continue to be used
unless decisively contradicted. Both the French "colloque" and
the UN study puts nuclear power and natural gas on a par as regards
environmental effects, and both much safer than use of coal or oil.
My tentative conclusion, however, is that if it were not for
global warming, no one would worry about the replacement of nuclear
power by natural gas. But in this conference we are explicitly
considering greenhouse gases so we must worry.
Other developed countries
For completeness I mention, but do not elaborate, the
situation in other countries. England, Germany and Sweden seem to
have a situation not unlike that in the USA. Austria, Denmark and
Italy have abandoned nuclear energy. France alone of European
countries has a well organized plan for construction, operation and
paying for nuclear power plants which is of some envy in the US.
Although their success is often attributed to having one type of
reactor, the latest in the series differs considerably from the
earliest. I contend that it is their planning which distinguishes
them. Japan has many diverse reactors; but although it does not
produce as much nuclear electricity as France, it also has a well
organized plan.
The economic and political situation in eastern Europe is
confused. Electricity is sold very cheaply - at less than half the
fossil fuel price on the international market. The incentive,
therefore, to use nuclear energy where the labor costs are
internal, or payments can at least be made within the former
COMECON system is considerable. They are trying to continue and
expand nuclear energy.
Western doubts about safety of Soviet designed reactors led
many western countries two years ago to call for their shutdown -
a plea echoed by some of the East European people. However, there
was unanimous agreement at a special meeting on safety of Soviet
reactors that the proper course is to help very competent
professionals in these countries upgrade their safety standards
(ANS 1992).
Developing countries
Every time a nuclear power plant is built instead of a fossil
fuel power plant it will play its proportionate part in reducing
the emission of greenhouse gases and limiting global warming. But
there has always been an additional concern about developing
countries. Will a developing country have a system like that in the
USSR (which led to Chernobyl) or one like that in France? (which
has had no major accident) It is common particularly for people
who call themselves liberals to be paternalistic and to state that
the technology is too hard for a developing country. But let us
look at the record. In 1955 most westerners, arrogant as we are,
would have considered Korea a developing country. Yet Korea has
built up a nuclear power program which appears to be operated as
well and as safely as any in the world. They have accepted the
advice, help and training of the western world without developing
an inferiority complex. The same applies to Korean industrial
development generally. In contrast, Iran had a better start than
Korea; it had oil money and a long intellectual tradition. But
its political problems in the late 70s led it to abandon nuclear
energy, and other industrial development has lagged. I was
Chairman of a committee reviewing the operation of the nuclear
power plants in Taiwan (Wilson 1992). It was abundantly clear to us
that the Chinese are technically, and in Taiwan politically, as
capable of running these plants as anyone in the world. Since our
report, the Republic of China had decided to build a fourth nuclear
reactor unit of two reactors by the year 2000.
In 1982 I visited Egypt and discussed Egypt's hopes for a
nuclear power plants to be built at El-Dabah, near the large
populated area of the Nile Delta. An elderly engineering Professor
asked whether I thought that Egypt was capable of operating such a
plant. I reminded him that in 1956 the British seriously stated
that Egypt was not competent to run the Suez canal by themselves.
Yet after Egypt took it over from the British Government, many
needed modernizations and improvements were made without fuss and
fanfare; the canal has probably been better and more safely run
than before. But it will be hard to compete with fossil fuels Oil and
natural gas are sold internally at prices far below the
international price, making an effective subsidy. If capital can
be provided to provide an equivalent subsidy for nuclear energy
Egypt seems a good candidate for expansion.
The fundamental feature of nuclear power, its energy density,
helps developing countries. To run a successful and safe nuclear
power program it is not necessary that all the people in the
country have technical training. I note that an attempt to
develop a windmill program in Egypt in the 1960s had failed; there
were too few technicians for maintenance. But for nuclear energy
one merely needs a small number of highly technically trained
people. As countries develop, this happens naturally as the bright
and privileged few are educated overseas. This can be called, and
is, elitism. It may be an unpopular thought to the starry eyed
liberals of Berkeley (CA) and Cambridge (MA). But is it wrong? I
suggest here that those developing countries that can politically
accept a technically trained elite, can have a successful nuclear
power program. But this technical training inevitably is
associated with a degree of political freedom that is sometimes
difficult for politicians of a developing country to accept. The
Philippines have built a nuclear reactor. Politically we did not
help; allowing domestic opposition to nuclear power to delay
shipping of parts to the Philippines. Worse still, the reactor was
associated with the old, discredited Marcos regime. There is a
widespread belief that Westinghouse paid a large bribe to Marcos'
family. It has taken several years for the perception of
corruption to fade. Only now are steps being taken to bring the
power plant into operation. But this could be a promising new
beginning.
Can we allow the "free market" between nations to decide which
countries are "allowed" to have nuclear power? I think not. All
the world must worry about a country that tries to develop nuclear
power but fails to support the technical elite; they will have
power plants that are badly run; there will inevitably be political
pressures to cut corners to provide output at the expense of
safety. Already Europeans and Americans see the importance of
ensuring that the power plants in the former USSR are run safely. We do
not want another Chernobyl. How the world is going to give
this help without being charged with interference in domestic
affairs is an interesting challenge.
The present situation of the republic of Armenia is
instructive. 3 years ago, after the earthquake, there was public
pressure to shut down their two VVER 400 reactors. They were built
in an area of high population density, and in an earthquake zone. Three
US engineers of Armenian ancestry visited the plants and
reported (Hadjian 1978) that although the reactors were earthquake
resistant, the auxiliary systems were not. The central government
of the USSR shut the plants down. Now Azerbaijan has cut off oil
supplies, and intercepted the natural gas pipeline from Russia.
Armenian industry is at a standstill. There is now a considerable
movement to restart them, event though there will have to be
extensive rehabilitation. The new President of the republic, Lev
TerPetrossian, was among those who 3 years ago wanted the plants to
shut down; but now the desperate situation of his country forces a
change in thinking. Armenia is searching for international
sources of capital for a loan to recommission the plants. This
example shows that political opposition is likely to reverse itself
when other more troublesome political situations dominate. It
seems vital, therefore, to ensure that neither San Onofre I or
Trojan be actually destroyed in the way Shoreham has been.
It is useful to realize that the low transportation costs of
nuclear fuel make nuclear energy particularly competitive in
countries with no indigenous fuel supplies such as Japan and
Taiwan. Such countries will also find that an attractive feature of
nuclear energy is the ability to store many years of supply on
site: compared with a typical 3 months for a fossil fuel power
plant. This leads to a degree of political security that may
match the historical needs of the country. Japanese are fond of
reminding us that they entered the first world war on the side of
the British (against the Germans) to safeguard supplies of
Manchurian coal; and entered the 2nd world war against the British,
Dutch and Americans, because of the oil embargo against them of
summer 1941.
Technological improvements.
Recently much fuss has been raised about a "new generation" of
reactors that is safer than the old. I believe that reducing this
probability further will have no influence on the anti-nuclear
community. Indeed a risk 1 benefit analysis gives a negative
balance, however low the risk, if the benefit if zero or negative
as many anti-nuclear people perceive. The calculated probability
of core failure is 10-5 instead of 10-4 (REF).
The discussion above
leads me to claim that the important issue is whether this safety
advantage can be translated into a lower construction cost, and
even more importantly a lower operating cost. One way might be less
regulation. If this can be done, nuclear power may revive. Since
an outsider cannot easily tell who is responsible for which cost,
all I can do is recommend intensive thought by the utility industry
and by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
There has been an order from the NRC commission to the staff
to make rule changes only when these are cost effective. Yet the
orders to Yankee-Rowe and San Onofre that forced their demise were
based on earlier (vague) rules. Nor has this order yet shown
itself in a reduction in O and M costs. Nor has it shown itself in
a general belief that the cessation of increase is permanent.
The next generation of plants may be more standardized, so
that the Utility Director may know what he is ordering. But
whether that will in fact happen and lead to the needed reduction
of cost is open to question. History has few recorded cases of
relaxed regulation. C. Northcote Parkinson (Parkinson 1950)
reminded us that the staff of the British Admiralty expanded
between 1914 and 1928 by 74% even as the number of capital ships
decreased by 68% and the numbers of sailors decreased by 31%. This
increase in the bureaucracy comes to a little over 5% per year.
Likewise, unless we take forceful action, the NRC staff will expand
at 5% per year well after the last nuclear power plant is shut
down!
In 1975, when the AEC was broken up, and ERDA and NRC were
created from the wreckage, I proposed an "Energy Regulatory
Commission" omitting the word nuclear. Maybe it is time to
consider this; then all energy supply methods might be considered
on an even basis. Then one can find out whether treated equally
nuclear power is expensive or not. If that cannot be done, maybe
state legislators can enact a nuclear set-aside for operating
plants to make sure that this option does not completely vanish.
Nuclear fusion has been studied for over 40 years as a source
of electricity which is environmentally superior to fission, and
offers an unlimited amount of fuel from sea water. It has suffered
in the past from too much optimism. This led to a public
discounting of any projection and has obscured the strides made in
the last 15 years. A test reactor (Joint European Torus, or JET in
Culham, England) has been close to achieving "break even"; generating
more heat than the electricity consumed by the reactor
itself. Since the fusion reactor is more complex than a fission
reactor, the cost of a fusion electricity generator is likely to be
higher than fission electricity generators if other factors are
equal. But if the safety advantage can be translated into simpler
regulation, fewer security guards and similar cost cutting
mechanisms, nuclear fusion may well have a bright future. In 1991
a special advisory committee of the US Department of Energy
recommended a program that might enable US to build an economically
competitive fusion power plant by 2020 (Stever 1991).
Conclusions
None of the factors that have led to the increase in cost of
nuclear energy, and other undesirable consequences, have changed
appreciably in the last 10 years (in the USA).
- the scientific future for nuclear power remains excellent
- the technical future for safe nuclear power is steadily
improving
- the economic future for nuclear power is still getting
worse
- the political future for nuclear power still looks bleak.
If it is desired to continue nuclear power development in
spite of the evident existence of some adamant opposition it is
necessary to reduce the possibility that the opposition can cause
expensive cost increases by legal delays. The recent "one-stop"
licensing must be seen in this light. However federal action is
not enough; the evacuation planning rule of 1980 gives a veto to
the Governor of each state, even though since 1989 it has been only
temporary and therefore merely a delay. It supplements the
considerable state power of economic regulation. Even individual
states have created and can continue to create a climate that
prevents any resurgence of nuclear power in the USA.
I believe that the only hope for a resurrection of nuclear
power in the USA is for a massive effort on public education by the
scientific and technical community. Scientists must speak out. In
particular, I call on physicists which field were the first
proponents of nuclear electric power, to make public statements. They
should do so soon before the industry has disappeared.
Some of the legislative and regulatory preconditions are in
place. We must insist that they be used. The NRC has a sound set
of "Safety Goals", but that does not prevent them proposing
additions to make the safety projections exceed these goals. NRC
in 1975 adopted a "definition" of "As Low As Reasonably Achievable"
ALARA, that improvements be made if they cost less than
$1000/manRem. Yet this does not stop NRC and EPA demanding
expenditures (especially for waste disposal that far exceed these
amounts. Lay people must be asked to join scientists in demanding
a proper comparison with other sources of electricity generation
and appropriate changes in all aspects of the industry including
its regulation. If nuclear proponents are correct these will
enable economic operation again. Unless this happens soon, the
present competent people in the nuclear industry will leave and new
students will not be attracted. It will then be more expensive and
less safe to start again. Although I do not now foresee such a
change, it might happen fast.
For the countries of the Pacific Rim, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and
even mainland China:
- the scientific future is the same as in the USA;
- the technical future is the same as in the USA;
- the economic future is bright and;
- the political future looks excellent.
This might be seen as one more example of why the next century
will be an "oriental century." The resurgence of nuclear power may
come from the orient; let us also hope that if and when it is again
economically and environmentally attractive for the USA, our
country will follow close behind. Otherwise our economy will
inevitably decline and we will become an undeveloping country.
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Figures
Figure 1: Some Energy Projections/ Compared
Figure 2: As 1 but will my suggestions of nuclear power increase
Figure 3: Total Cost of Yankee Rowe
Figure 4: Operating Cost of Yankee Rowe
Figure 5: Staff of Yankee Rowe
Figure 6: Operating for Industry (from Trojan)
Figure 7: Natural Gas Prices Next Few Years
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