

## Summary For Policymakers

The Third Assessment Report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) builds upon past assessments and incorporates new results from the past five years of research on climate change.<sup>1</sup> Many hundreds of scientists contributed to its preparation and review. This Summary for Policymakers describes the current state of understanding of the climate system and provides estimates of its projected future evolution.

### **An increasing body of observations gives a collective picture of a warming world and other changes in the climate system.**

The observed changes in climate over time have been documented extensively by a variety of techniques. Many of these trends are now established with high confidence; others are far less certain.

#### *The global-average surface air temperature has increased since the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century.*

- The global-average surface air temperature has increased by  $0.6 \pm 0.2^\circ\text{C}$  since about 1860, the earliest date for which sufficient data for global estimates are available (Figure 1a). This value is about  $0.15^\circ\text{C}$  larger than that estimated by the SAR<sup>2</sup> for the period up to 1994, mainly because of the relatively high temperatures of the additional years (1995 to 2000). The record shows a great deal of spatial and temporal variability; for example, most of the warming during the 20th century occurred during two periods (1910 to 1945 and since 1976).
- New analyses indicate that the magnitude of the warming in the 20th century is likely<sup>3</sup> to be the largest of any century during the past 1000 years for the Northern Hemisphere. It is likely that the 1990s was the warmest decade and 1998 the warmest year (Figure 1b).
- On average, night-time daily minimum temperatures over land have increased at about twice the rate of day-time daily maximum temperatures since about 1950 (approximately  $0.2^\circ\text{C}$  compared to  $0.1^\circ\text{C}$  per decade). This has lengthened the freeze-free season in many mid- and high-latitude regions.

[Insert Figure 1 here.]

#### *Temperatures have risen during the past four decades in the lowest few kilometres of the atmosphere.*

- Since the late 1950s (the period of adequate observations from weather balloons), the overall global temperature trends of the lower atmosphere and near-surface air temperature are similar ( $0.1^\circ\text{C}$  per decade).
- Since the start of the satellite record in 1979, both satellite and weather balloon measurements show that the global average temperature of the lower atmosphere has increased by about  $0.05^\circ\text{C}$  per decade. This is less than the global average increase in surface air temperature of approximately  $0.2^\circ\text{C}$  per decade. The difference in the rates of warming occurs primarily over the tropical and subtropical oceans, and about half of the difference remains unaccounted for.

#### *Snow cover and ice extent have decreased.*

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<sup>1</sup> *Climate change* in IPCC Working Group I usage refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, where *climate change* refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.

<sup>2</sup> The IPCC Second Assessment Report is referred to in this Summary for Policymakers as the SAR.

<sup>3</sup> In this Summary for Policymakers and in the Technical Summary, the following words have been used to indicate approximate judgmental estimates of confidence: *virtually certain* (greater than 99% chance that a result is true); *very likely* (90-99% chance); *likely* (66-90% chance); *medium likelihood* (33-66% chance); *unlikely* (10-33% chance); *very unlikely* (1-10% chance); *exceptionally unlikely* (less than 1% chance).

- 1 • There have been decreases of about 10% in the extent of snow cover since the late 1960s and a reduction of about  
2 two weeks in the annual duration of lake- and river-ice cover in the mid- and high-latitudes of the Northern  
3 Hemisphere, over the 20th century.  
4
- 5 • There has been a widespread retreat of mountain glaciers in non-polar regions during the 20th century.  
6
- 7 • Northern Hemisphere spring and summer sea-ice extent has decreased by about 10 to 15% since the 1950s. It is  
8 likely that there has been about a 40% decline in Arctic sea-ice thickness during late summer to early autumn in  
9 recent decades and a considerably slower decline in winter sea-ice thickness.

10  
11 ***Global average sea level has risen and ocean heat content has increased.***

- 12
- 13 • Tide-gauge data show that global-average sea level rose between 0.1 and 0.2 meters during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It is  
14 very likely that this is at least partly due to thermal expansion of sea water and widespread loss of land ice  
15 associated with 20th century warming.  
16
- 17 • The rate of sea-level rise during the 20<sup>th</sup> century was about ten times larger than the average rate over the last  
18 3000 years.  
19
- 20 • Global-ocean heat content has increased since the late 1950s, the period for which adequate observations of sub-  
21 surface ocean temperatures have been available.  
22

23 ***Changes have also occurred in other important aspects of climate.***

- 24
- 25 • Precipitation has increased by 0.5 to 1% per decade in the 20<sup>th</sup> century over most mid- and high-latitudes of the  
26 Northern Hemisphere continents. Rainfall has decreased over much of the sub-tropical land areas during the 20<sup>th</sup>  
27 century (-0.3% per decade), although recovering during recent years. There are insufficient data to establish  
28 trends in precipitation over the oceans.  
29
- 30 • It is likely that there has been an increase in heavy and extreme precipitation events, on average, in the mid- and  
31 high-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere.  
32
- 33 • Warm episodes of the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon have been more frequent, persistent,  
34 and intense since the mid-1970s. This recent behaviour of ENSO has been reflected in regional variations of  
35 precipitation and temperature over much of the tropics and subtropics.  
36

37 ***Some important aspects of climate appear not to have changed.***

- 38
- 39 • No significant trends of Antarctic sea-ice extent are apparent over the period of systematic satellite measurements  
40 (since the 1970s).  
41
- 42 • The observed intensities and frequencies of tropical and extra-tropical cyclones, and severe local storms show no  
43 clear long-term trends, but data are often sparse and inadequate.  
44  
45

46 **Emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols due to human activities continue to alter the**  
47 **atmosphere in ways that affect the climate system.**  
48

49 Changes in climate occur as a result of natural variability and as a result of external factors. The effects of external factors  
50 on climate can be broadly compared using the concept of radiative forcing<sup>4</sup>. A positive radiative forcing, such as  
51 produced by increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, leads to a warming of the surface. A negative radiative  
52 forcing, which can arise from an increase in some types of aerosols (microscopic airborne particles or droplets), gives rise

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<sup>4</sup> *Radiative forcing* is a measure of the effect a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-atmosphere system, and is an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism.

1 to a cooling. Natural factors, such as changes in solar output or explosive volcanic activity, can also induce radiative  
2 forcing. Characterization of these climate forcing agents and their changes over time is required to understand past  
3 climate changes in the context of natural variations and to project what climate changes could lie ahead. Figure 2 shows  
4 current estimates of the radiative forcing due to increased concentrations of atmospheric constituents and other forcing  
5 mechanisms.

6  
7 [Insert Figure 2 here.]  
8

9 ***Concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases, with associated radiative forcing, have continued to increase due***  
10 ***to human activities.***

- 11
- 12 • Since 1750, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) has increased by one-third. The present CO<sub>2</sub>  
13 concentration has not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years and likely not during the past 20 million years.  
14 The rate of increase is unprecedented during at least the past 20,000 years.
- 15
- 16 • Over two-thirds of the increase in atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> during the past 20 years is due to fossil fuel burning. The rest  
17 is due to land-use change, especially deforestation, and, to a lesser extent, cement production.
- 18
- 19 • Both the ocean and the land are taking up anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub>. Ocean CO<sub>2</sub> uptake is governed by chemical  
20 processes. Causes of land CO<sub>2</sub> uptake include CO<sub>2</sub> and nitrogen fertilisation and changes in land management.  
21 On land, the uptake of CO<sub>2</sub> currently exceeds the release of CO<sub>2</sub> by deforestation.
- 22
- 23 • The rate of increase of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration has been about 0.4%/yr over the past two decades. During  
24 the 1990's, the annual increase varied by a factor of three. A large part of this variability is due to the effect of  
25 climate variability on CO<sub>2</sub> uptake and release by land and oceans.
- 26
- 27 • Atmospheric methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) concentrations have increased by a factor of 2.5 since 1750 and continue to increase.  
28 The annual increase in CH<sub>4</sub> atmospheric concentrations has become slower and more variable in the 1990s,  
29 compared to the 1980s.
- 30
- 31 • The atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O) has increased by 16% since 1750.
- 32
- 33 • The atmospheric concentrations of many of those halocarbon gases that are both ozone-depleting and greenhouse  
34 gases, are either decreasing or increasing more slowly in response to reduced emissions under the regulations of  
35 the Montreal Protocol and its Amendments. Their substitute compounds and some other synthetic compounds  
36 (e.g., perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>)) are increasing rapidly in the atmosphere from  
37 recent near-zero concentrations.
- 38
- 39 • The radiative forcing of the well-mixed greenhouse gases is estimated to be 2.42 Wm<sup>-2</sup>. The largest contribution is  
40 from CO<sub>2</sub> (1.46 Wm<sup>-2</sup>), followed by CH<sub>4</sub> (0.48 Wm<sup>-2</sup>), the halocarbons (0.33 Wm<sup>-2</sup>), and N<sub>2</sub>O (0.15 Wm<sup>-2</sup>).
- 41
- 42 • The observed depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer over the past two decades has caused a negative radiative  
43 forcing (–0.15 Wm<sup>-2</sup>). Assuming full compliance with current regulations, recovery of the ozone layer is  
44 expected over this century, thereby eliminating this negative forcing.
- 45
- 46 • The calculated one-third increase since 1750 in tropospheric ozone due to anthropogenic emissions of several  
47 ozone-forming gases is estimated to have caused a significant positive radiative forcing (0.35 Wm<sup>-2</sup>). Ozone  
48 forcing varies considerably by region and responds much more quickly to changes in emissions than the long-  
49 lived greenhouse gases, such as CO<sub>2</sub>.

50  
51 ***Most anthropogenic aerosols are short lived and generally produce negative radiative forcing.***

- 52
- 53 • Since the SAR, significant progress has been achieved in better characterising the direct radiative roles of types of  
54 aerosols other than sulphate, including black carbon (soot), organics, mineral dust, and sea salt. There is much

1 less confidence in the ability to quantify the total aerosol effect, and its evolution over time, than that for the  
2 gases listed above. Aerosols also vary considerably by region and respond quickly to changes in emissions.

- 3  
4 • There is now more evidence for the indirect effect of anthropogenic aerosols on the structure of clouds, but the  
5 estimates of radiative forcing remain very uncertain.

6  
7 ***Natural agents have contributed small amounts to radiative forcing over the past century.***

- 8  
9 • The radiative forcing due to changes in the radiant energy emitted from the sun for the period since 1750 is  
10 estimated to be about one-fifth that due to CO<sub>2</sub>, mainly due to an increase during the first half of the 20th century.  
11 Since the late 1970s, satellite instruments have observed small oscillations due to the 11-year solar cycle.  
12  
13 • Mechanisms for the amplification of solar effects on climate have been proposed, but lack a rigorous theoretical  
14 or observational basis.  
15  
16 • Stratospheric aerosols from large volcanic eruptions lead to significant negative forcing, which lasts a few years.  
17 Several major eruptions occurred in the periods 1880 to 1920 and 1960 to 1991, with weak volcanic activity in  
18 the interim and no major eruptions since 1991.  
19  
20 • The net radiative forcing effect of the two major natural factors (solar variation and volcanic aerosols) is  
21 estimated to be negative for the past two and possibly four decades, in contrast to the positive forcing for  
22 greenhouse gases.  
23

24  
25 **Confidence in the ability of models to project future climates has increased.**

26  
27 Complex climate models are required to provide detailed estimates of feedbacks and of regional detail. Quantitative  
28 estimates of some globally averaged parameters can be made with simpler models calibrated against complex models.

- 29  
30 • Understanding of climate processes and their representation in climate models has improved, including water  
31 vapour, sea-ice dynamics, and ocean heat transport.  
32  
33 • Some recent models produce satisfactory climate simulations without the need for non-physical adjustments of  
34 the heat and water fluxes at the ocean-atmosphere interface.  
35  
36 • Several models have reproduced the observed warming trend in surface air temperature during the 20<sup>th</sup> century,  
37 when forced with increases in greenhouse gases and sulphate aerosols. This general consistency provides an  
38 implicit constraint on model projections of global temperature for the next few decades.  
39  
40 • Some aspects of model simulations of ENSO, monsoons and the North Atlantic Oscillation have improved.  
41  
42 • The greatest uncertainty in modelling future climate still arises from clouds and their interactions with radiation  
43 and aerosols.  
44

45  
46 **There is now stronger evidence for a human influence on global climate than at the time of**  
47 **the Second Assessment Report.**

48  
49 The SAR concluded: "The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate". That  
50 report also noted that the anthropogenic signal was still emerging from the background of natural climate variability.  
51 Further, it pointed out that there were uncertainties in a number of relevant factors, including internal variability and  
52 the magnitude and patterns of forcing and response, that prevented making a stronger conclusion at that time. New  
53 evidence allows for an updated assessment of this conclusion.  
54

- 1 • *There is a longer and more closely scrutinised temperature record and new model estimates of variability.* Three  
2 of the years since the SAR (1995, 1997, and 1998) are the warmest in the instrumental record of global  
3 temperatures. Reconstructions of climate data for the past 1000 years and model estimates of natural climate  
4 variations suggest that the observed warming over the past 100 years is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin.  
5
- 6 • *There are new estimates of the climate response to natural and anthropogenic forcing, and new detection  
7 techniques have been applied.* Detection and attribution studies consistently find evidence for an anthropogenic  
8 signal in the climate record of the last 35-50 years. Furthermore, model estimates of the rate of anthropogenic  
9 warming are consistent with observations in the majority of cases. Simulations of the response to natural forcings  
10 alone, including the response to solar variability and volcanic eruptions, indicate that natural forcings may play a  
11 role in the observed warming in the first half of the 20th century, but fail to explain the warming in the latter half  
12 of the century, (see Figure 3).  
13
- 14 • *The effect of anthropogenic greenhouse gases over the last 50 years can be identified despite uncertainties in  
15 other forcings.* The sulphate forcing, while uncertain, is negative over this period and changes in natural forcing  
16 during most of this period are also estimated to be negative.  
17

18 It is likely that increasing concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases have contributed substantially to the  
19 observed warming over the last 50 years. Nevertheless, the accuracy of estimates of the magnitude of anthropogenic  
20 warming, and particularly of the influence of the individual external factors, continues to be limited by uncertainties  
21 in estimates of internal variability, natural and anthropogenic radiative factors, in particular the forcing by  
22 anthropogenic aerosols, and the climate response to those factors.  
23

24 [Insert Figure 3]  
25  
26

## 27 **Atmospheric composition will continue to change throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century.**

28

29 Climate models have been used to make projections of future climate based upon greenhouse gas and aerosol  
30 scenarios from the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES). To enable a direct comparison with the  
31 SAR, the IS92a scenario is also shown in some cases.  
32

### 33 *Greenhouse gases*

34

- 35 • Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> due to fossil-fuel burning are virtually certain to be the dominant influence on the trends in  
36 atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration during the 21st century. As CO<sub>2</sub> concentration increases and climate changes,  
37 ocean and land will take up a progressively decreasing proportion of anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. By the end of  
38 the century, models project CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations of 540 to 970 ppm (compared to the pre-industrial concentration  
39 of 280ppm, and about 367ppm today). This range is due to differences among the SRES emissions scenarios;  
40 different model assumptions would add at least ±10% uncertainty to these projections.  
41
- 42 • The sequestration of carbon by changing land use could influence atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. However,  
43 even if all of the carbon so far released by land use changes could be restored to the terrestrial biosphere (e.g., by  
44 reforestation), CO<sub>2</sub> concentration would be reduced by only 40 to 70 ppm.  
45
- 46 • Model calculations of the concentrations of the non-CO<sub>2</sub> greenhouse gases by 2100 vary considerably across the  
47 SRES scenarios. In some scenarios, tropospheric ozone would become as important a radiative forcing agent as  
48 CH<sub>4</sub> and would threaten the attainment of air quality targets over much of the Northern Hemisphere.  
49

### 50 *Aerosols*

51

- 52 • The SRES scenarios include the possibilities of either increases or decreases in anthropogenic aerosols. In  
53 addition, natural aerosols (e.g. sea salt, dust, and emissions leading to the production of sulphate and carbon  
54 aerosols) may increase as a result of changes in climate and atmospheric chemistry.  
55

### 1 *Radiative forcing*

- 2
- 3 • For the SRES scenarios, the global mean radiative forcing due to greenhouse gases will continue to increase up to
- 4 2100, with the fraction due to CO<sub>2</sub> becoming even greater than for the present day. The direct aerosol radiative
- 5 forcing is estimated to be substantially smaller in magnitude than that of CO<sub>2</sub>.
- 6

### 8 **Global average temperature and sea level are projected to rise under all SRES scenarios.**

9

10 In order to make projections of future climate, models incorporate past, as well as future, emissions of greenhouse

11 gases and aerosols. Hence they include estimates of warming to date and the commitment to future warming from past

12 emissions.

### 14 *Temperature*

- 15
- 16 • The globally averaged surface air temperature increase from 1990 to 2100 for the range of SRES scenarios is
- 17 estimated to be about 1.5 to 6.0°C, (Figure 4 (b)). This increase would be without precedent during the last ten
- 18 thousand years. By comparison, the temperature range presented in the SAR was 1 to 3.5°C, based on the IS92
- 19 scenarios. The difference is mainly due to the reduced future sulphur dioxide emissions in the SRES scenarios.
- 20 The estimates are derived from a simple model adapted to yield a similar response to a range of complex models.<sup>5</sup>
- 21
- 22 • By 2100, the differences in the surface air temperature response across the group of complex models forced with
- 23 a given scenario is as large as the range obtained from a single model forced with the different SRES scenarios.
- 24
- 25 • A coherent picture of regional climate change using regionalisation techniques, such as regional climate models,
- 26 is not yet possible. However, based on recent global model simulations, it is likely that nearly all land areas will
- 27 warm more rapidly than the global average, particularly those at high latitudes in the cold season. Most notable is
- 28 the warming in the northern regions of North America, and northern and central Asia, which is in excess of 40%
- 29 above the global-mean change. In contrast, the warming is less than the global-mean change in south and
- 30 southeast Asia in summer and southern South America in winter.

31 [Insert Fig. 4 here]

### 34 *Precipitation*

- 35
- 36 • Globally averaged water vapour and precipitation are projected to increase. Based on recent global model
- 37 simulations, it is likely that precipitation will increase over northern mid- and high-latitudes and Antarctica in
- 38 winter. At low latitudes there are both regional increases and decreases, which are likely to be emissions scenario
- 39 dependent.

### 41 *Extreme Events*

- 42
- 43 • Analyses of past data and improvements in climate models, since the SAR, have enabled changes in extreme
- 44 events observed to date to be compared to similar changes in model simulations for future climate, see Table 1.

45 **Table 1** – Observed and modelled changes in extremes of weather and climate.

	<b>Observed (20th century, last 50 years)</b>	<b>Projections from Models (end of 21<sup>st</sup> century, 2050-2100)#</b>
Higher maximum temperatures and more hot days	nearly all land areas	most models

46

<sup>5</sup> These estimates are consistent with climate sensitivity in the range 1.5 to 4.5°C. This estimate is unchanged from the time of the first and second assessment reports. The climate sensitivity is the equilibrium response of global surface temperature to a doubling of equivalent CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. The range of estimates arises from uncertainties in the climate models and their internal feedbacks, particularly those due to clouds and related processes. Factors that affect the time dependent response, e.g., ocean heat uptake, are not included in this concept.

Increase of heat index	many land areas	most models
More intense precipitation events	many northern hemisphere mid- to high-latitude land areas	most models
Higher minimum temperatures and fewer cold days	virtually all land areas	most models
Fewer frost days	virtually all land areas	physically plausible based on increased minimum temperatures
Reduced diurnal temperature range	most land areas	most models
Summer continental drying	few areas	most models
Increase in tropical cyclone peak wind intensities	not observed, but very few analyses	some models
Increase in tropical cyclone mean and peak precipitation intensities	insufficient data	some models

1  
2 #In the models column, the phrase “most models” indicates that a number of models have been analysed for such a  
3 change, all those analysed show it in most regions, and it is physically plausible. No models have been analysed to show  
4 fewer frost days, but it is physically plausible since most models show an increase in night-time minimum temperatures,  
5 which would result in fewer frost days. The phrase “some models” indicates that theoretical studies and those models  
6 analysed show such a change, but only a few current climate models are configured in such a way to reasonably represent  
7 such changes. The assessment of model results represents very large scale changes, in some regions the changes of certain  
8 extremes may not agree with the larger scale changes.

- 9
- 10 • For some other extreme phenomena, many of which may have important impacts on the environment and society,  
11 there is currently insufficient information to assess recent trends, and the confidence in models and understanding is  
12 inadequate to make firm projections. The intensity of mid-latitude storms is a good example. Further, very small-  
13 scale phenomena, such as thunderstorms, tornadoes, hail and lightning, are not simulated in global models. Recent  
14 trends for conditions to become more El Niño-like in the tropical Pacific are projected to continue in many models,  
15 although confidence in such projections is tempered by some shortcomings in how well El Niño is simulated in  
16 global climate models.

17  
18 *Atmospheric and Oceanic Circulation*

- 19  
20 • Most models show weakening of the Northern Hemisphere thermohaline circulation (THC). Even in models where  
21 the THC weakens, there is still a warming over Europe due to increased greenhouse gases. It is not known whether  
22 irreversible collapse in the THC could occur or not, or at what threshold it might occur, although none of the current  
23 projections with climate models exhibits a complete shut down of the THC during the next 60 years.

24  
25 *Snow and Ice*

- 26  
27 • Northern Hemisphere snow cover and sea-ice extent are projected to decrease further.
- 28  
29 • Glaciers and icecaps (excluding the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica) will continue their widespread retreat  
30 during the 21st century.
- 31  
32 • The ice sheet over West Antarctica contains enough ice to raise sea level by 6 meters and, because it is grounded  
33 below sea level, rapid ice discharge may occur in response to ocean warming. Major loss of grounded ice and  
34 accelerated sea-level rise is now believed to be very unlikely during the 21st century.

35  
36 *Sea Level*

- 37  
38 • For the range of SRES scenarios, a sea-level rise of 0.14 to 0.80 metres is projected for 1990 to 2100, with a central  
39 value of 0.47 metres, which is about 2 to 4 times the rate over the 20<sup>th</sup> century, (Figure 4 (c)).

40  
41 *Climate change will persist for many centuries*

- 1  
2 • Stabilisation of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations at all levels considered in this report will entail substantial  
3 reductions in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. To achieve any given equivalent CO<sub>2</sub> stabilisation target, continued emissions of  
4 other greenhouse gases would require even lower CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.  
5  
6 • Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> have a lasting effect on atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations. Even several centuries after emissions  
7 are eliminated, the amount remaining in the atmosphere is 20 to 30% of the total emitted.  
8  
9 • Global mean surface temperature will continue to increase and sea level will continue to rise due to thermal  
10 expansion for hundreds of years after concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> have been stabilised, owing to the long timescales on  
11 which the deep ocean adjusts to climate change.  
12  
13 • Ice sheets will continue to react to climate change for thousands of years after climate has been stabilised. Models  
14 project that a local annual-average warming of larger than 3°C, sustained for millennia, would lead to virtually a  
15 complete melting of the Greenland ice sheet. A local warming of 5.5°C, consistent with mid-range stabilisation  
16 scenarios, would result in a contribution from Greenland of 3 metres to sea-level rise in 1000 years. Current ice  
17 dynamic models project that the West Antarctic ice sheet will contribute no more than 3 metres to sea-level rise over  
18 the next 1000 years, but its dynamics are still inadequately understood, especially for projections on longer timescales.  
19  
20

### 21 **Many gaps in information and understanding remain**


22  
23 Many factors continue to limit our ability to detect, attribute, and understand current climate change and to project what  
24 future climate changes may be. Further work is needed in eight broad areas:  
25

- 26 • Arrest the decline of observational networks in many parts of the world.  
27  
28 • Expand the observational foundation for climate studies to provide accurate, long-term data with expanded  
29 temporal and spatial coverage.  
30  
31 • Improve estimates of future emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols, and their forcings.  
32  
33 • Understand and characterise more completely dominant processes (e.g., ocean mixing) and feedbacks (e.g., from  
34 clouds and sea ice) in and between the atmosphere, biota, land and ocean surfaces, and deep oceans.  
35  
36 • Address more completely patterns of long-term climate variability.  
37  
38 • Explore more fully the probabilistic character of future climate states by developing multiple ensembles of model  
39 calculations.  
40  
41 • Improve the integrated hierarchy of global and regional climate models with emphasis on improving the simulation  
42 of regional impacts and extreme weather events.  
43  
44 • Link more effectively, physical climate-biogeochemical models with models of the human system and thereby  
45 provide the basis for expanded exploration of possible cause-effect-cause patterns linking human and non-human  
46 components of the Earth system.  
47

48 Cross-cutting these foci are crucial needs associated with strengthening the co-operation within the international  
49 research community, building research capacity in many regions, quantifying uncertainties and, as is the goal of this  
50 assessment, effectively and describing research advances in terms that are relevant to decision making.

## 1 Figures


## Variations of the Earth's surface temperature for:



2  
3  
4 **Figure 1. The Earth's surface temperatures vary year by year (bars) and decade by decade (smoothed curves).**  
5 Over the past 140 years, the global average surface temperature has increased by about 0.6°C (Panel a). Additionally,  
6 the year-by-year variations of the average surface temperature in the Northern Hemisphere for the past 1000 years  
7 have now been reconstructed from "proxy" data (Panel b). While the uncertainties (shaded area) in the millennial  
8 reconstruction are understandably larger than those of the more recent instrumental record, it is nevertheless clear that  
9 the overall warming of the 20th century has been atypical compared to the rest of the past 1,000 years in the Northern  
10 Hemisphere. Indeed, it is likely that the rate and duration of the warming of the 20th century is the largest of the  
11 millennium in the Northern Hemisphere. Similarly, it is likely that the 1990s have been the warmest decade in the  
12 millennium, and 1998 the warmest year. [Based upon (a) Figure 2.7c and (b) Figure 2.20]  
13 (Note: Figure 1 (a) will be updated to include data for the year 2000 prior to the WGI Plenary)

1

**The radiative forcing of the climate system relative to 1750 by gases, aerosol particles, aviation, land use, and solar variation**



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
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**Figure 2. Many factors give rise to climate change.** These radiative forcings arise from changes in the atmospheric composition, alteration of surface reflectance by land use, and variation in the output of the sun. Except for solar variation, some form of human activity is linked to each. The rectangular bars represent estimates of the relative contributions of changes in these climate forcings - some yielding warming, some yielding cooling - from 1750 to the late 1990s. Forcing due to emissions from volcanoes, which lead to a negative forcing lasting for a few years, is not shown. The indirect effect of aerosols shown is their effect on the size and number of cloud droplets. A second indirect effect of aerosols on clouds, namely their effect on cloud lifetime, which would also lead to a negative forcing, is not shown. Some of the forcings possess a much greater degree of certainty than others. The vertical line about the rectangular bars indicates an estimate of the uncertainty range, for the most part guided by the spread in the published values of the forcings. A vertical line without a rectangular bar denotes a forcing for which no central estimate can be given owing to large uncertainties. The overall level of scientific understanding for each forcing varies considerably, as noted. Some of the radiative forcing agents are well mixed over the globe, such as CO<sub>2</sub>, thereby perturbing the *global* heat balance. Others represent perturbations with stronger regional signatures because of their spatial distribution, such as aerosols. For this and other reasons, a simple sum of the positive and negative bar heights cannot yield the net effect on the climate system. Rather, the better-quantified forcings (such as well-mixed greenhouse gases, ozone, sulphate aerosols, and solar) have been included in climate models. The simulations of this assessment report (for example, Figure 3) indicate that the estimated net effect of these perturbations is to have warmed the global climate since 1750, with the most perturbation and hence the most warming being in the past century. [Based upon Figure 6.6]

## Simulated annual global mean near-surface temperatures



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4 **Figure 3. Simulating the Earth's temperature variations, and comparing the results to measured changes, can**  
5 **provide clues to the underlying causes of the major changes.** A climate model can be used to simulate the  
6 temperature changes that occur both from natural and anthropogenic causes. The simulations represented by the band  
7 in Figure 3 (a) were done with only natural forcings: solar variation and volcanic activity. Those encompassed by the  
8 band in Figure 3 (b) were done with anthropogenic forcings: greenhouse gases and an estimate of sulphate aerosols,  
9 and those encompassed by the band in Figure 3 (c) were done with both natural and anthropogenic forcings included.  
10 From Figure 3 (b), it can be seen that inclusion of anthropogenic forcings provides a plausible explanation for a  
11 substantial part of the observed temperature changes over the past century, but the best match with observations is  
12 obtained in Figure 3 (c) when both natural and anthropogenic factors are included. The bands of model results  
13 presented here are for four runs from the same model. Similar results are obtained with other models with  
14 anthropogenic forcing. [Based upon Figure 12.7].

1 **Figure 4. The global climate of the 21st century** will  
 2 depend on natural changes and the response of the  
 3 climate system to human activities. Climate models can  
 4 simulate the response of many climate variables - such  
 5 as increases in global surface temperature and sea level  
 6 - to various scenarios of greenhouse gas and other  
 7 human-related emissions. Figure 4(a) shows the CO<sub>2</sub>  
 8 emissions of the six illustrative SRES scenarios, which  
 9 are summarized in the box below, along with IS92a for  
 10 comparison purposes with the SAR. Emissions of other  
 11 gases and aerosols were included in the model but are  
 12 not shown in the figure. Figures 4 (b) and (c) show the  
 13 simulated temperature and sea-level responses  
 14 respectively from a simple model adapted to yield  
 15 similar responses to several complex models. Estimates  
 16 of the radiative forcings have been used in the model to  
 17 make the projections. The “several models all SRES  
 18 envelope” in Figures 4 (b) and 4 (c) shows the  
 19 temperature and sea level rise respectively for the  
 20 simple model when tuned to a number of complex  
 21 models with a range of climate sensitivities. The “model  
 22 average all SRES envelope” shows the average from  
 23 these models for the range of scenarios. Note that the  
 24 warming and sea level rise from these emissions would  
 25 continue well beyond 2100. [Based upon (a) Figure  
 26 3.12, (b) Figure 9.14, (c) Figure 11.12].

63  
 64  
 65 **B2.** The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in  
 66 which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social and  
 67 environmental sustainability. It is a world with continuously  
 68 increasing global population, at a rate lower than A2, intermediate  
 69 levels of economic development, and less rapid and more diverse  
 70 technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the  
 71 scenario is also oriented towards environmental protection and  
 72 social equity, it focuses on local and regional levels.  
 73  
 74 An illustrative scenario was chosen for each of the six scenario  
 75 groups A1B, A1FI, A1T, A2, B1 and B2. All should be considered  
 equally sound.

**The Emission Scenarios of the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES)**

29 **A1.** The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of  
 30 very rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-  
 31 century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and  
 32 more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are  
 33 convergence among regions, capacity building and increased cultural  
 34 and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional  
 35 differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops  
 36 into three groups that describe alternative directions of technological  
 37 change in the energy system. The three A1 groups are distinguished by  
 38 their technological emphasis: fossil intensive (A1FI), non-fossil  
 39 energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all sources (A1B) (where  
 40 balanced is defined as not relying too heavily on one particular energy  
 41 source, on the assumption that similar improvement rates apply to all  
 42 energy supply and end use technologies).

43 **A2.** The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very  
 44 heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and  
 45 preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions  
 46 converge very slowly, which results in continuously increasing  
 47 population. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented  
 48 and per capita economic growth and technological change more  
 49 fragmented and slower than other storylines.

50 **B1.** The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent  
 51 world with the same global population, that peaks in mid-century and  
 52 declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid change in  
 53 economic structures toward a service and information economy, with  
 54 reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and  
 55 resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions  
 56 to economic, social and environmental sustainability, including  
 57 improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives.

